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Abstract. LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [15] proposed the extended
Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model and an AKE protocol, called NAXOS.
Unlike previous security models, the adversary in the eCK model is al-
lowed to obtain ephemeral secret information related to the test session,
which makes the security proof difficult. To overcome this NAXOS com-
bines an ephemeral private key x with a static private key a to generate
an ephemeral public key X; more precisely X = gH(x,a). As a result,
no one is able to query the discrete logarithm of X without knowing
both the ephemeral and static private keys. In other words, the discrete
logarithm of an ephemeral public key, which is typically the ephemeral
secret, is hidden via an additional random oracle.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct eCK-secure protocol
without the NAXOS’ approach by proposing two eCK-secure protocols.
One is secure under the GDH assumption and the other under the CDH
assumption; their efficiency and security assurances are comparable to
the well-known HMQV [12] protocol. Furthermore, they are at least as
secure as protocols that use the NAXOS’ approach but unlike them and
HMQV, the use of the random oracle is minimized and restricted to the
key derivation function.
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1 Introduction
Using key exchange two parties can establish a common secret, called a session
key, via a public communication channel. Diffie and Hellman [10] proposed the
first key exchange protocol in which two parties exchange X = gx, Y = gy and
derive a session key from gxy = Y x = Xy. The original Diffie-Hellman (DH)
protocol does not provide authentication and is vulnerable to active person-
in-the-middle attacks. A key exchange protocol is authenticated key exchange
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(AKE) if both parties are assured that only their intended peers can derive the
session key.
Bellare and Rogaway [5] proposed the first security model and definition for
authenticated key exchange that allows a rigorous analysis. Their model is indis-
tinguishability based, where an adversary is required to differentiate between a
random key and a session key. There have been several variations to the Bellare-
Rogaway model and until recently, the Canetti-Krawczyk [8] (CK) model was
regarded as one of the most significant BR modifications.
The CK model, however, fails to capture some desirable AKE properties.
CK-secure protocols may still be vulnerable to key compromise impersonation
(KCI) attack or may not be resilient to the leakage of ephemeral private keys
(LEP). Resilience to LEP is motivated by scenarios where the session specific
information is stored in an insecure place or the random number generator used
by a party is corrupt.
To bring these attacks and properties within the scope of analysis, LaMac-
chia, Lauter and Mityagin changed the CK model, to the so called eCK model,
and proposed NAXOS as an example of an eCK-secure protocol. Informally, the
eCK aims to allow all adversary queries, except those that trivially break AKE
protocols. In particular the eCK adversary is allowed to obtain ephemeral se-
cret information related to the test session, which makes the security arguments
in the eCK model difficult. To achieve eCK security, NAXOS requires that the
ephemeral public key X be computed from an exponent made up by hashing an
ephemeral private key x and the static private key a, more precisely, X = gH(x,a)
instead of X = gx. In this paper generating ephemeral public key as X = gH(x,a)
is called NAXOS’ approach. In NAXOS’ approach no one is able to query the
discrete logarithm of an ephemeral public key X without the pair (x, a); thus the
discrete logarithm of X is hidden via an extra random oracle. Using NAXOS’
approach many protocols [25, 11, 16, 17] were argued secure in the eCK model
under the random oracle assumption. In the standard model, the only (to our
knowledge) eCK-secure protocol is due to Okamoto [22]; it uses pseudo-random
functions instead of hash functions.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct eCK-secure AKE
protocols without NAXOS’ approach by giving two example protocols. Protocol 1
relies on the Gap Diffie-Hellman and the random oracle assumptions. Protocol 2
is derived by applying the trapdoor technique introduced by Cash, Kiltz and
Shoup [9] to Protocol 1, and thus uses Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption
instead of the gap assumption.
Our protocols provide no less security assurances than protocols utilizing the
NAXOS’ approach in the sense that our analysis considers leakage of the discrete
logarithm of ephemeral public keys. One advantage of this method (see [26])
is to reduce the risk of leaking the static private key, since the derivation of
the ephemeral public key is independent from the static private key. This is in
contrast to protocols that use the NAXOS’ approach. In addition, unlike other
eCK secure protocols and HMQV, which require at least two random oracles,
we minimize the use of the random oracle, by applying it only to the session key
derivation.
Organization. In section 2, we recall the security assumptions and the trapdoor
test, which we use in this paper. In section 3, we briefly outline the eCK model
and then propose our new protocols with security arguments in sections 4 and 5.
In section 6 we compare our protocols with other relevant protocols and conclude
in section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q and generator g. Let dlg : G → Zq be
the discrete logarithm (DL) function which takes an input X ∈ G and returns
x ∈ Zq such that X = gx. Define the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
function dhg : G2 → G as dhg(X,Y ) = gdlg(X)dlg(Y ), and the corresponding
decisional predicate ddhg : G3 → {0, 1} as a function which takes an input
(X,Y, Z) ∈ G3 and returns 1 if Z = dhg(X,Y ) and 0 otherwise.
The advantage of an algorithm S in solving the CDH problem, AdvCDH(S),
is the probability that, given input X,Y selected uniformly at random from G, S
returns dhg(X,Y ). Similarly, the advantage of an algorithm S in solving the Gap
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem, AdvGDH(S), is the probability that, given input
X,Y selected uniformly at random in G and oracle access to ddhg( · , · , · ), S
returns dhg(X,Y ).
We say that G satisfy the CDH (resp. GDH) assumption if no probabilistic
polynomial-time bounded algorithm can solve the CDH (resp. GDH) problem
on G with non-negligible advantage.
In the security argument of Protocol 2 we will use the following theorem,
called the trapdoor test, (see [9] for theorem details).
Theorem 1 (Trapdoor Test in [9]). Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q,
generated by g ∈ G. Suppose X1, r, s are mutually independent random variables,
where X1 takes values in G, and each of r, s is uniformly distributed over Zq,
and define the random variable X2 := gs/Xr1 . Further, suppose that Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2 are
random variables taking values in G, each of which is defined as some function
of X1 and X2. Then we have:
1. X2 is uniformly distributed over G;
2. X1 and X2 are independent;
3. if X1 = gx1 and X2 = gx2 , then the probability that the truth value of
Zˆr1 Zˆ2
?= Yˆ s (1)
does not agree with the truth value of
Zˆ1
?= Yˆ x1 ∧ Zˆ2 ?= Yˆ x2 (2)
is at most 1/q; moreover, if (2) holds, then (1) certainly holds.
3 Security Model
For further eCK details and explanations see [15].
In the eCK model, each party is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing ma-
chine and is assigned a static public and private key pair together with a certifi-
cate that binds party’s identity to its public key. We denote a party’s identity
A,B, C, . . . 3. We assume that, the certificate authority (CA) does not require
proof of possession of the corresponding private key included in a certificate.
However, CA verifies that the public key is in G× = G−{idG}, where idG is the
identity element of G.
We outline the eCK model for two-pass Diffie-Hellman protocols, where two
parties A and B exchange static and ephemeral public keys and thereafter com-
pute a session key that depends on the exchanged public keys and identities of
the parties.
Session. An invocation of a protocol is called a session. Session activation
is made via an incoming message of the forms (I,A,B) or (R,A,B, Y ). If A
was activated with (I,A,B), then A is called the session initiator, otherwise
it is called the session responder. After activation, session initiator A creates
ephemeral public key X and sends (R,B,A, X) to the session responder B,
who then prepares ephemeral public key Y , computes the session key and sends
(I,A,B, X, Y ) to A. Upon receiving (I,A,B, X, Y ), A also computes a session
key for the session A owns. We say that a session is completed if its owner
computes a session key.
If A is the initiator of a session, the session is identified via (I,A,B, X,×)
or (I,A,B, X, Y ). For a responder A the session is identified via (R,A,B, Y,X).
The matching session of (I,A,B, X, Y ) is a session with identifier (R,B,A, X, Y )
and vice versa. In the remainder of the paper we will omit I and R since these
“role markers” are implicitly defined from the order of ephemeral public keys.
Adversary. The adversary M is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine
that controls all communications including session activation, performed via
Send(message) query. The message has one of the following forms: (pid,pid),
(pid,pid, X), or (pid,pid, X, Y ), where pid and pid are identities. Each party
submits its responses to the adversary, who decides the global delivery order.
The adversary does not have immediate access to a party’s private infor-
mation. However, leakage of private information is captured via the following
adversary queries:
– EphemeralKeyReveal(sid) The adversary obtains the ephemeral secret key
associated with the session sid.
3 In the eCK model the adversary selects these identifier strings.
– SessionKeyReveal(sid) The adversary obtains the session key for the ses-
sion sid, provided that the session holds a session key.
– StaticKeyReveal(pid) The adversary learns the static secret key of the
party pid.
– EstablishParty(pid)4 This query allows the adversary to register a static
public key on behalf of a party pid; the adversary totally controls that party.
If a party pid is established by EstablishParty(pid) query issued by adver-
sary, then we call the party dishonest. If not, we call the party honest. This
query models malicious insider.
To define eCK security we need the following definition.
Definition 1 (Freshness). Let sid∗ be the session identifier of a completed
session, owned by an honest party A with peer B, who is also honest. If the
matching session exists, then let sid∗ be the session identifier of the matching
session of sid∗. Define sid∗ to be fresh if none of the following conditions hold:
1. Adversary issues a SessionKeyReveal(sid∗) or SessionKeyReveal(sid∗)
query (if sid∗ exists)
2. sid∗ exists and Adversary makes either of the following queries
– both StaticKeyReveal(A) and EphemeralKeyReveal(sid∗), or
– both StaticKeyReveal(B) and EphemeralKeyReveal(sid∗)
3. sid∗ does not exist and Adversary makes either of the following queries
– both StaticKeyReveal(A) and EphemeralKeyReveal(sid∗), or
– StaticKeyReveal(B)
Security Experiment. Initially, the adversary M is given a set of honest
parties, for whomM selects identifiers. Then the adversary makes any sequence
of the queries described above. During the experiment,M makes a special query
Test(sid∗), where sid∗ is a fresh session, and is given with equal probability either
the session key held by sid∗ or a random key; the query does not terminate the
experiment. The experiment continues until M makes a guess whether the key
is random or not. The adversary wins the game if the test session sid∗ is still
fresh and if M guess was correct.
Definition 2 (eCK security). The advantage of the adversaryM in the AKE
experiment with AKE protocol Π is defined as
AdvAKEΠ (M) = Pr[M wins]−
1
2
.
4 Formally, this query is not available in the eCK model [15], where the adversary is
only allowed to selects identities of parties and establishes dishonest parties before
starting the interaction with the parties. This does not present a deficiency in the
model since the query gives the addition power to the adversary to decide (dishonest)
party specific information after observing the behavior of honest parties.
We say that an AKE protocol Π is secure in the eCK model if the following
conditions hold:
1. If two honest parties complete matching sessions, then, except with negligible
probability, they both compute the same session key.
2. For any probabilistic polynomial-time bounded adversary M, AdvAKEΠ (M)
is negligible.
4 Protocol 1
In sections 4 and 5, we offer two eCK-secure protocols without NAXOS’ ap-
proach. The following are parameters used in the protocol descriptions.
Parameters. Let k/2 be the security parameter and G be a cyclic group with
generator g and order a k-bit prime q. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a crypto-
graphic hash function modeled as a random oracle. Party A’s static private key
is a pair a1, a2 ∈ Z×q and his public key is the pair A1 = ga1 , A2 = ga2 ∈ G×.
Similarly, the party B’s static keys are b1, b2 ∈ Z×q , B1 = gb1 , B2 = gb2 ∈ G×.
4.1 Protocol 1 description
In the description, A is the session initiator and B is the session responder.
1. A chooses at random an ephemeral private key x ∈ Z×q , computes the
ephemeral public key X = gx and sends (B,A, X) to B.
2. Upon receiving (B,A, X), B verifies that X ∈ G×. If so, B chooses at
random an ephemeral private key y ∈ Z×q and computes the ephemeral
public key Y = gy. After computing the shared secrets Z1 = (XA1)y+b1 ,
Z2 = (XA2)y+b2 , the session key SK = H(Z1, Z2, X, Y,A,B) and sending
(A,B, X, Y ) to A, B completes the session with session key SK.
3. Upon receiving (A,B, X, Y ), A checks if he owns a session with session
identifier (A,B, X, ×). If so, A verifies that Y ∈ G× and computes Z1 =
(Y B1)x+a1 , Z2 = (Y B2)x+a2 and completes the session (A,B, X, Y ) with
session key SK = H(Z1, Z2, X, Y,A,B).
Both parties compute the shared secrets Z1 = g(x+a1)(y+b1), Z2 = g(x+a2)(y+b2)
and therefore compute the same session key SK.
4.2 Protocol 1 security argument
Theorem 2. If the GDH assumption holds in G and H is a random oracle,
then the Protocol 1 is eCK-secure.
Proof. Let M be a polynomially bounded adversary against Protocol 1, that
runs in time t(k), activates at most n(k) honest parties, at most s(k) sessions
and makes at most h(k) queries to the oracle H, where t(k), n(k), s(k), and
h(k) are polynomially bounded in k. Assume also that AdvAKEProtocol 1(M) is non-
negligible. Since H is modeled as a random oracle, the adversary M has only
three ways to distinguish a session key of the test session from a random string.
– A1. Guessing attack: M correctly guesses the session key.
– A2. Key replication attack: M creates a session that is not matching to the
test session, but has the same session key as the test session.
– A3. Forging attack: M computes Z1 and Z2 used in the test session, and
queries H with (Z1, Z2, X, Y,A,B).
Since H is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of H is
O(1/2k), which is negligible. Since non-matching sessions have different commu-
nicating parties or ephemeral public keys, key replication is equivalent to finding
an H-collision; therefore the probability, that event A2 occurs, is O(s(k)2/2k),
which is also negligible. Thus events A1 and A2 can be ruled out.
Let M be the event that M wins the security game, H be the event that M
queries H with (Z1, Z2, X, Y,A,B), and H the complementary event of H. Since
H is a random oracle and events A1 and A2 were ruled out, we have Pr[M|H] = 12
except with negligible difference. Then
Pr[M] = Pr[M ∧H] + Pr[M| H] Pr[H] ≤ Pr[M ∧H] + 1
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AdvAKEProtocol 1(M) ≤ Pr[M ∧H] = Pr[A3]
Since AdvAKEProtocol 1(M) is non-negligible, Pr[A3] is also non-negligible.
Now, consider the following complementary sub-events of A3.
– E1. A3 occurs and the test session has no matching session.
– E2. A3 occurs and the test session has a matching session.
Then
Pr[A3] = Pr[E1] + Pr[E2]
Consider also the following sub-events of E1 so that E1 = E1a ∨ E1b.
– E1a. E1 occurs and M does not reveal the ephemeral private key of the
owner of the test session, but may query for the static private key of the test
session owner.
– E1b. E1 occurs and the owner’s static private key of the test session has
never been revealed by M, but may query for the ephemeral private key of
the test session owner.
Consider also the following sub-events of E2 so that E2 = E2a∨E2b∨E2c∨E2d.
– E2a. E2 occurs andM does not reveal the ephemeral private keys of both the
owner of the test session and its peer, but may query for the static private
keys of the test session peers.
– E2b. E2 occurs andM does not reveal the static private keys of both the test
session and its matching session, but may query for the ephemeral private
keys of the test session peers.
– E2c. E2 occurs and the owner’s ephemeral private key and the peer’s static
private key of the test session have never been revealed by M, but M may
query StaticKeyReveal with the identity of the test session owner and query
EphemeralKeyReveal with the session matching to the test session.
– E2d. E2 occurs and the owner’s static private key and the peer’s ephemeral
private key of the test session have never been revealed by M, but M
may query StaticKeyReveal with the identity of the test session peer and
EphemeralKeyReveal with the test session.
We then have
Pr[E1] ≤ Pr[E1a] + Pr[E1b] (3)
Pr[E2] ≤ Pr[E2a] + Pr[E2b] + Pr[E2c] + Pr[E2d]. (4)
We will show how to construct a GDH solver S that uses a Protocol 1 ad-
versary M. The solver S is given a CDH instance (U, V ), where U and V are
selected uniform randomly in G, access to a ddhg(· , · , ·) oracle and has to com-
pute dhg(U, V ). Without loss of generality in the analysis, we denote the test
session owner and peer by A and B, respectively, and assume that A is the
initiator.
Analysis of E1a. We use M to construct a GDH solver S that succeeds with
non-negligible probability provided that event E1a occurs. S prepares n(k) hon-
est parties, selects one party B to whom S assigns static public key B1 = V,B2 =
V r, where S randomly chooses r ∈ Zq. The remaining n(k) − 1 parties are as-
signed random static public and private key pairs. S also chooses a session sid∗,
owned by an honest party A.
When M activates sessions between honest peers S follows the protocol de-
scription. Since S knows static private keys of at least one peer, it can respond
all queries faithfully. The only exception is the session sid∗, for which S sets the
ephemeral public key of sid∗ to U , and chooses a random ζ ∈ {0, 1}k as the
session key of sid∗.
The simulator has difficulty in responding queries related to B because S
does not know the static private key of B. More precisely, for sessions owned
by B with peer C controlled by M, S cannot compute shared secrets Z1, Z2,
but may have to answer SessionKeyReveal queries. Note that M can obtain
session keys of these session by computing the shared secrets Z1, Z2 and query
H. If two values do not coincide, then S fails its simulation. To handle this
situations, S prepares Rlist with entries of the form (pid,pid,W,W ′,SK) ∈
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G2 × {0, 1}k, which is maintained for consistent responses
to H and SessionKeyReveal queries.
We next describe the action of S whenM makes queries related to B. In the
following, Y is generated by the party B. Recall that if the session identifier is
(B, C, X, Y ) (resp. (B, C, Y,X)), then B is the session responder (resp. initiator).
– Send(B, C): S randomly selects y ∈ Z×q , computes Y = gy, creates a new
session with sid (B, C, Y,×) and returns (C,B, Y ) to M.
– Send(B, C, X): S randomly selects y ∈ Z×q , compute Y = gy, creates a new
session with sid (B, C, X, Y ) and returns (C,B, X, Y ) to M.
– Send(B, C, Y,X): S checks if B owns a session with sid (B, C, Y,×). If not,
the session is aborted; otherwise, S updates sid to (B, C, Y,X).
– H(·): S maintains an initially empty list Hlist with entries of the form
(Zˆ1, Zˆ2,W,W ′,pid,pid,SK) ∈ G4 × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k and sim-
ulates a random oracle in the usual way except for queries of the form
(Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B) and (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,X,B, C). When (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B) (resp.
(Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,X,B, C)) is queried, S does one of the following.
1. If (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B,SK) (resp. (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,X,B, C,SK)) ∈ Hlist for some
SK, then S returns SK to M.
2. Otherwise, S checks if there exists (B, C, X, Y,SK) (resp. (B, C, Y,X,SK))
∈ Rlist such that ddhg(XC1, Y B1, Zˆ1) = 1 and ddhg(XC2, Y B2, Zˆ2) = 1.
If such a pair exists, S returns SK from Rlist, and stores the new tuple
(Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B,SK) (resp. (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,X,B, C,SK)) in Hlist.
3. If neither of the above two cases hold, then S chooses SK ∈ {0, 1}k at
random, returns it toM and stores the new tuple (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B,SK)
(resp. (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,X,B, C,SK)) in Hlist.
– SessionKeyReveal(B, C, X, Y ) or SessionKeyReveal(B, C, Y,X): S main-
tains an initially empty list Rlist with entries of the form (pid, pid,W,W ′,SK)
∈ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗×G2×{0, 1}k. When SessionKeyReveal(B, C, X, Y ) (resp.
(B, C, Y,X)) is queried, S does one of the following.
1. If there is no session with identifier (B, C, X, Y ) (resp. (B, C, Y,X)), the
query is aborted.
2. If (B, C, X, Y,SK) (resp. (B, C, Y,X,SK)) ∈ Rlist for some SK, S returns
SK to M.
3. Otherwise, go through Hlist to find (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, X, Y, C,B,SK) (resp. (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Y,
X,B, C,SK)) satisfying ddhg(XC1, Y B1, Zˆ1) = 1 and ddhg(XC2, Y B2, Zˆ2)
= 1. If such a pair exists, S returns SK, and stores the new tuple
(B, C, X, Y,SK) (resp. (B, C, Y,X,SK)) in Rlist.
4. If none of the above three cases hold, then S chooses SK ∈ {0, 1}k at
random, returns it toM and stores the new tuple (B, C, X, Y,SK) (resp.
(B, C, Y,X,SK)) in Rlist.
– EphemeralKeyReveal(·): S responds to the query faithfully.
– StaticKeyReveal(B) or EstablishParty(B): S aborts.
– Test(sid): If sid 6= sid∗, S aborts. Otherwise, S randomly chooses ζ ∈ {0, 1}k
and returns it to the adversary M.
Provided that event E1a occurs and M selects the session sid∗ as the test
session with peer B, the simulation does not fail; let Y denote the test session
incoming ephemeral public key. If M is successful with non-negligible probabil-
ity it must have queried H with inputs Zˆ1 = (Y B1)x
∗+a1 and Zˆ2 = (Y B2)x
∗+a2 ,
where x∗ ≡ dlg(U) mod q, because S sets the ephemeral public key X∗ of
sid∗ as U . To solve the CDH instance, S checks if there is an H query made
by M of the form (Z1, Z2, U, Y,A,B), such that ddhg(UA1, Y B1, Z1) = 1 and
ddhg(UA2, Y B2, Z2) = 1. If such an H query exists, S computes5 Z∗1 = Z1/(Y B1)a1
and Z∗2 = Z2/(Y B2)
a2 . If Z1, Z2 are correct, then since B1 = V and dlg(B2) ≡
r · dlg(B1) mod q we have,
Z∗1/Z
∗
2 = (B1/B2)
x = Udlg(B1)−dlg(B2).
Therefore, by computing
(
Z∗1/Z
∗
2
)1/(1−r)
, S can find Udlg(B1) = dhg(U, V ).
With probability at least 1s(k)n(k) , the test session is sid
∗ with peer B. Thus,
the advantage of S is
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E1a]. (5)
Analysis of E1b. S prepares n(k) honest parties, selects two distinct parties,
say A and B, and assigns A’s and B’s static public keys as A1 = U,A2 = Us and
B1 = V,B2 = V r, respectively, where r and s are random elements of Zq. The
remaining n(k) − 2 parties are assigned random static and private key pairs. If
M activates sessions owned by any honest party except A and B, then S follows
the protocol description. The parties A and B are simulated as in the case E1a.
If M selected the session sid∗ as the test session with owner A and peer
B, this simulation does not fail provided that the event E1b occurs. If M
is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with in-
puts of the form Z1 = (Y B1)x+dlg(A1), Z2 = (Y B2)x+dlg(A2). To solve CDH,
S checks if there is an H query made by M of the form (Z1, Z2, X, Y,A,B),
such that ddhg(XA1, Y B1, Z1) = 1 and ddhg(XA2, Y B2, Z2) = 1. If such
an H query exists, S computes Z∗1 = Z1/(Y B1)x, Z∗2 = Z2/(Y B2)x. Since
(Z∗2 )
1/s = ((Y B2)dlg(A2))1/s = (Y B2)dlg(A1),
Z∗1/(Z
∗
2 )
1/s = Adlg(B1)−dlg(B2)1 .
Therefore, from
(
Z∗1/(Z
∗
2 )
1/s
)1/(1−r)
, S can find Adlg(B1)1 = dhg(U, V ).
With probability at least 1n(k)2 , M will select a test session with owner and
peer A and B, respectively. Thus the advantage of S is
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
n(k)2
Pr[E1b]. (6)
5 Note that the computation requires the knowledge of a1 and a2, and therefore it
must be the case that A 6= B.
Analysis of E2a. S prepares n(k) honest parties, and assigns random static
public and private key pairs for these parties. S also chooses two session sid∗, sid∗.
Let A be the owner of sid∗ and B owner of sid∗. S sets the ephemeral public key
of sid∗ to be U and of sid∗ to be V . Hence S’s simulation for M can fail only if
M issues EphemeralKeyReveal against sid∗ or sid∗.
Provided that M selects the session sid∗ as the test session with owner A
and peer B and sid∗ as its matching session, and event E2a occurs, then the
simulation does not fail. If M is successful with non-negligible probability it
must have queried H with Z1 = (Y B1)dlg(U)+a1 , Z2 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+a2 . To solve
the CDH instance, S checks if there is an H query (Z1, Z2, U, V,A,B), such
that ddhg(UA1, V B1, Z1) = 1 and ddhg(UA2, V B2, Z2) = 1. If such an H query
exists, S computes dhg(U, V ) by computing Z1/(U b1V a1Ab11 ).
With probability 1s(k)2 , M selects sid∗ as the test session and sid∗ as its
matching session. Thus, the advantage of S is
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)2
Pr[E2a]. (7)
Analysis of E2b, E2c and E2d. For event E2b,E2c,E2d, S’s simulation is
similar to E1b,E1a,E1a, respectively. We omit the details and provide only the
conclusion:
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
n(k)2
Pr[E2b] (8)
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2c] (9)
AdvGDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2d]. (10)
Combining equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10), the advantage of S is
AdvGDH(S) ≥ max
{ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E1a],
1
n(k)2
Pr[E1b],
1
s(k)2
Pr[E2a],
1
n(k)2
Pr[E2b],
1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2c],
1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2d]
}
.
Since Pr[A3] is non-negligible, from (3), (4), at least one of Pr[E1a], · · · ,Pr[E2d]
is non-negligible, and therefore AdvGDH(S) is non-negligible. During the simula-
tion, S performs group exponentiations, queries the DDH oracle, and simulates
H. All of these take polynomially bounded time because a group exponentia-
tion takes time O(k) and t(k), n(k), s(k), h(k) are polynomial in k. Therefore,
the running time of S is polynomially bounded. Hence, S is a polynomial-time
algorithm that solves the GDH problem in G with non-negligible probability,
which contradicts the assumed security of GDH problem in G. This completes
the argument.
5 Protocol 2
5.1 Protocol 2 description
Protocol 2 is similar to Protocol 1 and follows below. The difference between the
two protocols is that Protocol 2 computes two additional shared secrets. In the
description, A is the session initiator and B session responder.
1. A chooses at random an ephemeral private key x ∈ Z×q , computes the
ephemeral public key X = gx and sends (B,A, X) to B.
2. Upon receiving (B,A, X), B verifies that X ∈ G×. If so, B chooses at
random an ephemeral private key y ∈ Z×q , computes the ephemeral pub-
lic key Y = gy. After computing the shared secrets Z1 = (XA1)y+b1 ,
Z2 = (XA1)y+b2 , Z3 = (XA2)y+b1 , Z4 = (XA2)y+b2 , the session key
SK = H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, X, Y,A,B) and sending (A,B, X, Y ) to A, B com-
pletes the session with session key SK.
3. Upon receiving (A,B, X, Y ), A checks if he owns a session with identifier
sid = (A,B, X,×). If so, A verifies Y ∈ G× and computes Z1 = (Y B1)x+a1 ,
Z2 = (Y B2)x+a1 , Z3 = (Y B1)x+a2 , Z4 = (Y B2)x+a2 and completes the ses-
sion sid = (A,B, X, Y ) with session key SK = H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, X, Y,A,B).
Both parties compute the same Z1 = g(x+a1)(y+b1), Z2 = g(x+a1)(y+b2), Z3 =
g(x+a2)(y+b1), Z4 = g(x+a2)(y+b2) and therefore compute the same session key
SK.
5.2 Security proof
Theorem 3. If the CDH assumption for G holds and H is a random oracle,
then the Protocol 2 is eCK-secure.
Proof. The security proof of Protocol 2 is similar to that of Protocol 1; only
the differences are explained here. LetM be a polynomially bounded adversary
against Protocol 2, that runs in time t(k), activates at most n(k) honest parties,
at most s(k) sessions and makes at most h(k) queries to the oracle H, where t(k),
n(k), s(k) and h(k) are polynomially bounded in k. Assume also thatM succeeds
with non-negligible advantage. As the case of Protocol 1, the adversary has only
three ways to distinguish a session key of a test session from a random string:
guess, key replication or forging attack. Since H is a random oracle guessing and
key replication occur only with negligible probability.
We use the same events and notation as in the security proof of Protocol 1. In
event A3,M computes Z1, Z2, Z3 and Z4 used in the test session and queries H
with (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, X, Y,A,B). As in the security proof of Protocol 1 we show
how to construct a CDH solver S.
In the S’s simulations of environment of M, the most important point is to
maintain consistency between H and SessionKeyReveal queries when S does
not know static private key of the honest party that is activated. Such situations
occur when S embeds the CDH instance into the honest party’s static public key.
So, ifM queries H with (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4, X, Y, C,B) or (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4, Y,X,B, C),
then S has to be able to check the correctness of Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4.
We now explain how S maintains the consistency. Let B be an honest party
whose static public key is B1 = V , B2 = gs/V r, where s and r are randomly
selected from Zq by S. Let C be a party (not necessarily an honest one) whose
static public key is C1, C2. WhenM queries H with (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4, X, Y, C,B) or
(Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4, Y,X,B, C), we may assume that there is a session with identifier
(B, C, X, Y ) or (B, C, Y,X). Otherwise, it is sufficient for S to return a random
string to M. Suppose there is a session with identifier (B, C, X, Y ), since B is
honest, Y is generated by S, so dlg(Y ) is known to S, who can compute
Z¯1 = Zˆ1/(XC1)y, Z¯2 = Zˆ2/(XC1)y, Z¯3 = Zˆ3/(XC2)y, Z¯4 = Zˆ4/(XC2)y
The values Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3, Zˆ4 are generated according to the protocol if and only if
Z¯1 = (XC1)dlg(B1), Z¯2 = (XC1)dlg(B2), Z¯3 = (XC2)dlg(B1) and Z¯4 = (XC2)dlg(B2).
The algorithm S can check if Zˆ1, Zˆ2, Zˆ3 and Zˆ4 are generated according to the
protocol specifications by verifying
Z¯r1 Z¯2 = (XC1)
s, Z¯r3 Z¯4 = (XC2)
s;
the verification holds with probability at least
(
1− 1q
)2 when r, s are randomly
choosen from Z×q (see Theorem 1). When there is a session with identifier
(B, C, Y,X), similar verification can be performed. In this case, Z¯1 = Zˆ1/(XC1)y,
Z¯2 = Zˆ2/(XC2)y, Z¯3 = Zˆ3/(XC1)y, Z¯4 = Zˆ4/(XC2)y and S checks if Z¯r1 Z¯3 =
(XC1)s and Z¯r2 Z¯4 = (XC2)
s.
To complete the security proof, an explanation of how to embed and solve
CDH instance in the cases E1a, E1b, E2a, E2b, E2c and E2d is still needed.
E1a case. Suppose that the test session is (A,B, X, Y ), where A 6= B, X = U ,
and party B’s static public key is B1 = V,B2 = gs/V r with randomly choosen
r, s ∈ Z×q . In the event E1a, the ephemeral public key Y is controlled by
M. If M is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried
H with inputs of the form Z1 = (Y B1)dlg(U)+a1 , Z2 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+a1 , Z3 =
(Y B1)dlg(U)+a2 and Z4 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+a2 . From these values, S can compute
Z∗1 = Z1/(Y B1)
a1 , Z∗2 = Z2/(Y B2)
a1 ; note that
Z∗1/Z
∗
2 = U
dlg(B1)−dlg(B2) = U (1+r)dlg(B1)−s
because rdlg(B1) + dlg(B2) ≡ s mod q. Therefore, from
(
(Z∗1/Z
∗
2 ) · Us
)1/(1+r)
,
S can compute Udlg(B1) = dhg(U, V ). With probability at least 1s(k)n(k) , U is the
test session outgoing ephemeral public key and B is the test session peer. Since
the probability that some trapdoor test yields an incorrect answer is at most
2h(k)/q, the advantage of S is
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E1a]− 2h(k)
q
. (11)
E1b case. Suppose that the test session is (A,B, X, Y ), where A 6= B and
A’s static public key is A1 = U,A2 = gs′/Ur′ and B’s static public key is
B1 = V,B2 = gs/V r with randomly choosen r, s, r′, s′ ∈ Z×q . In the event
E1b, Y is controlled by M, but S selects X and so S knows dlg(X). If M
is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with in-
puts of the form Z1 = (Y B1)dlg(U)+dlg(A1), Z2 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+dlg(A1), Z3 =
(Y B1)dlg(U)+dlg(A2) and Z4 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+dlg(A2). From these values, S can
compute Z∗1 = Z1/(Y B1)
x, Z∗2 = Z2/(Y B2)
x; note that
Z∗1/Z
∗
2 = A
dlg(B1)−dlg(B2)
1 = A
(1+r)dlg(B1)−s
1
Therefore, from
(
(Z∗1/Z
∗
2 ) · As1
)1/(1+r)
, S can compute Adlg(B1)1 = dhg(U, V ).
With probability at least 1
n(k)2
, the test session peers are A and B, and hence
the advantage of S is
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
n(k)2
Pr[E1b]− 2h(k)
q
. (12)
E2a case. Suppose that the test session and its matching sessions are (A,B, X, Y )
and (B,A, X, Y ), respectively, where X = U and Y = V (the case where X = V
and Y = U is similar). The simulator S knows the static private key of all
honest parties including A and B. If M is successful with non-negligible prob-
ability, it must have queried H with inputs of the form Z1 = (Y B1)dlg(U)+a1 ,
Z2 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+a1 , Z3 = (Y B1)dlg(U)+a2 and Z4 = (Y B2)dlg(U)+a2 . From
these, S can obtain dhg(U, V ) by computing Z1/(U b1V a1Ab11 ). With probability
at least 1
s(k)2
, the test session has ephemeral public keys U and V , and hence
the advantage of S is
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)2
Pr[E2a]. (13)
E2b, E2c, E2d cases. For cases E2b, E2c and E2d, the arguments are similar
to E1b, E1a, and E1a, respectively; therefore
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
n(k)2
Pr[E2b]− 2h(k)
q
(14)
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2c]− 2h(k)
q
(15)
AdvCDH(S) ≥ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2d]− 2h(k)
q
(16)
Combining equations (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), the advantage of S is
AdvCDH(S) ≥ max
{ 1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E1a],
1
n(k)2
Pr[E1b],
1
s(k)2
Pr[E2a],
1
n(k)2
Pr[E2b],
1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2c],
1
s(k)n(k)
Pr[E2d]
}
− 2h(k)
q
.
As the security proof of Protocol 1, if AdvAKEProtocol 2(M) is non-negligible,
then Pr[A3] is also non-negligible and thus at least one of Pr[E1a], . . . , Pr[E2d]
is non-negligible. Therefore, AdvCDH(S) is non-negligible. Moreover, during the
simulation, S performs group exponentiations and simulates H, all of which take
polynomially bounded in k time . Thus, the running time of S is bounded by a
polynomial in k time. Therefore, S is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves
the CDH problem in G with non-negligible advantage, which contradicts the
hardness of the CDH problem in G. This concludes the argument.
Remark 1. In the security argument of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, for simplicity
we do not allow the test session to be of the form (A,B, X, Y ), where A = B.
However, if we allow the session of the form (A,A, X, Y ), then the arguments
can be modified to solve the Square computational Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) prob-
lem. The SCDH problem is given X ∈ G, compute Xdlg(X)2 . More precisely, in
Protocol 1 this case is reduced to solve SCDH problem given DDH oracle, and
in Protocol 2 reduced to solve SCDH problem. Also, note that CDH problem is
equivalent to SCDH problem in prime order cyclic group G, see [2].
6 Comparison
In this section, we compare our protocols with other related PKI-based two-pass
AKE protocols in terms of underlying assumption, computational efficiency and
security model. In Table 1 number of exponentiation in G, number of static
public keys in terms of group elements and number of ephemeral public key
in terms of group elements are denoted by E, sPK and ePK, respectively. All
protocols are eCK secure except for HMQV, which is a modification of MQV [13].
It is secure in a modified CK [8] model and has additional security properties
like resistance to KCI attack, wPFS, and resistance to LEP under GDH and
knowledge of exponent assumptions (KEA1) [3].
When comparing computational efficiency, we do not take into account public-
key validation, which is a necessary procedure to prevent potential leakage of
private information similar to invalid-curve attacks [1] and small subgroup at-
tacks [14]; see also [19, 21].
Table 1 presents the naive group exponentiations count; the numbers in
parentheses reflect exponentiations using speedup techniques from [18, §2.3]
and [20, Alg. 14.88]. The reduced numbers follow from: (i) HMQV, CMQV,
and Okamoto’s protocol can use simultaneous exponentiation [20, Alg. 14.88];
and (ii) NAXOS, NAXOS+, Huang-Cao protocol, and Protocol 2 have the same
base and can save time when applying Right-to-Left binary method. More pre-
cisely, in our Protocol 2, from the point of view of protocol initiator, Z1, Z3 and
Z2, Z4 have the same base Y B1 and Y B2, respectively. Thus, when applying
Right-to-Left binary method the value (Y B1)2
i
(resp. (Y B2)2
i
) can be reused
for Z1, Z3 (resp. Z2, Z4). Similar arguments apply to NAXOS, NAXOS+ and
Huang-Cao’s protocol.
Protocol Computation Security
Model
Assumption NAXOS Num. of
approach sPK/ePK
Okamoto [22]
8E
(4.14E)
eCK
piPRF,
O 2/3
DDH, Standard
HMQV [12]
2.5E
(2.17E)
CK, wPFS, KEA1, × 1/1
KCI, LEP GDH, RO
CMQV [25] 3E (2.17E) eCK GDH, RO O 1/1
NAXOS [15] 4E (3.17E) eCK GDH, RO O 1/1
NETS [17] 3E eCK GDH, RO O 1/1
SMEN− [26] 6E (2.46E) eCK GDH, RO × 2/2
Protocol 1 3E eCK GDH, RO × 2/1
NAXOS+ [16] 5E (3.34E) eCK CDH, RO O 1/1
Huang-Cao [11] 5E (4.17E) eCK CDH, RO O 2/1
Protocol 2 5E (3.34E) eCK CDH, RO × 2/1
Table 1. Protocol Comparison
Okamoto’s protocol is secure in the standard model, but the proof depends
on a rather strong assumption of the existence of piPRF family. In the security
proof of HMQV and CMQV, the reduction argument is less tight since the
Forking Lemma [24] is essential for the arguments. In comparison, the rest of the
protocols in Table 1, including Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, have tighter security
reductions and do not use the Forking Lemma.
No NAXOS’ approach. As shown in Table 1, Protocol 1 has the same char-
acteristic as NETS and Protocol 2 has the same characteristic as NAXOS+ in
computation efficiency, security model, and underlying assumption. The differ-
ence is that our protocols dispenses with NAXOS’ approach, at the expense of
an additional group element in the static key. SMEN− also has features similar
to Protocol 1: it is eCK-secure in the random oracle model under the GDH as-
sumption, does not use NAXOS’ approach and a static public key is a pair of
group elements. It achieves better computational performance (2.46 vs 3 expo-
nentiations), but requires that the an ephemeral key constitutes of two group
elements. Therefore it provides a trade-off between computation and communi-
cation efficiencies.
We showed that it is possible to construct eCK-secure AKE protocols with-
out using NAXOS’ approach, so our protocols are secure even when the discrete
logarithm of the ephemeral public key is revealed. As pointed out in [26], proto-
cols that do not rely on NAXOS’ approach decrease the risk of leaking the static
private key in comparison with protocols that ustilize the NAXOS’ approach.
This feature makes protocols like ours, SMEN− and HMQV more practical.
Another advantage of our protocols is the use of single random oracle as
opposed to two for HMQV and CMQV. The random oracle is needed for the
session key derivation, which is typical way to attain indistinguishability in ran-
dom oracle model. As pointed in [7], although protocols secure in the random
oracle model produce assurance for the scheme’s correctness, there may remain
some fear since concrete hash function instantiations differ from a truly random
function. In the sense of minimal reliance on random oracles, our protocols and
SMEN− are the best among protocols in Table 1.
7 Conclusion
The extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) definition introduced by LaMacchia,
Lauter and Mityagin is a strong security model for authenticated key exchange.
This paper presented two eCK-secure AKE protocols without using NAXOS’
approach. As a result, our protocols provide strong security assurances without
compromising too much on efficiency. In addition, we minimized the reliance
on the random oracle for the security argument and were able to utilize the
trap-door test to assume only computational assumptions.
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